Introduction
The term political constraint is used to describe economic decision making under the constraint that decisions have to be largely acceptable to the general population. This constraint is central to the theoretical literature on the economics of transition, for example Dewatripont and Roland (1995) . These models assume that voters, with rational expectations, taking stock of endowments from the planning era, can predict, under some uncertainty, whether they would become "winners" or "losers" of the reform process. Any successful reform sequence has to satisfy political constraints. 1 This assumes not only do economic conditions affect voting outcomes but, in the language of political scientists, economic voting should be prospective in nature, both of which are major debates in the field.
Theoretical and empirical work on the economics of voting in Western democracies constitutes a vast area of both the political science and economics literatures. Studies applying such economic voting models to post-communist countries, however, have been quite limited to date. Using economic models to explain voting patterns is particularly appropriate for the former communist societies, where economic considerations are paramount and can substantially affect vote choice due to low party identification. Unlike established democracies where voters have been socialised within their political and economic system, voters in transition countries have no prior experience of competitive political parties, 2 free elections and indeed a market economy. Therefore, analysing economic voting in a system undergoing vast structural changes and subsequent economic and political turbulence enables the investigation of whether voting is influenced by past, present or future economic conditions. In general, the retrospective voting hypothesis receives most 4 attention in the economic voting literature. The popularity of the retrospective approach stems from the difficulty in distinguishing retrospective voting from prospective voting. As rational voters form expectations based on current and past economic conditions, the boundaries between the two approaches are often blurred and can be hard to empirically separate out. 3 Elections in emerging democracies such as the Czech Republic, however, enable a better test of the retrospective/prospective debate. 4 The first free election in a post-communist society represented a natural break in history, whereby one-party communist rule was replaced by a multi-party democratic system and voters' choice sets were expanded to include a variety of new political parties. As the majority of these parties did not exist, or lay dormant during the previous four decades (apart from the former-ruling Communist Party), voters could not rely on cues from the past in order to form judgments about the future.
Therefore, unlike electoral decisions in established democracies, voters in the Czech
Republic in 1990 could not evaluate political parties based on their previous economic performance in government.
The most comprehensive survey of voting studies in the post-communist world was carried out by Tucker (2002) . He created a database of 101 articles on elections and voting in post-communist countries, which were published between 1990 and 2000. While Tucker identifies ten economic voting studies in his database (Pacek, 1994; Gibson and Cielecka, 1995; Bell, 1997; Fidrmuc, 2000a Fidrmuc, , 2000b Tucker, 2000a Tucker, , 2001 Colton, 1996a; Mason and Sidorenko-Stephenson, 1997; Powers and Cox, 1997; and Harper, 2000) , none explicitly examine the Czech Republic. In addition, while Fidrmuc, Pacek, and Tucker go a long way in explaining Czech voting patterns in a multi-country context, given the cross-sectional nature of these studies they do not 5 investigate the initial determinants of voting patterns. These studies suggest that the traditional retrospective hypothesis may not be an appropriate strategy in a postcommunist context; however, explicit tests for the presence of prospective voting are not performed. From a theoretical viewpoint Stokes (2001) also argues that the retrospective voting hypothesis may not be an appropriate strategy in emerging democracies which are undergoing radical economic transformation and proposes three alternative prospectively orientated hypotheses. This paper, therefore, takes advantage of the unique experiences initiated by the fall Communism, to provide the first comprehensive test of the retrospective/prospective debate by analysing voting behaviour in the Czech Republic throughout its post-communist transition.
We test whether the winners and losers of economic reform actually determined voting behaviour using evidence from the first five national elections in the Czech Republic. We propose that voters at the regional level, taking stock of endowments from the planning era, could predict whether they would become "winners" or "losers" of the transition process. Using survey data we measure the percentage of individuals, by region, who were "afraid" and "not afraid" of economic reforms in 1990. We define the former as potential "winners" who should vote for pro-reform parties, while the latter are potential "losers" who should support left-wing parties. Using national election results, we demonstrate that there is persistence in support for pro-reform and communist parties driven by prospective voting on initial conditions. As a result, we show that regional unemployment rates in 2002 are good predictors of regional voting patterns in 1990. We provide empirical evidence that political constraints actually bind during transition.
Classic economic voting models typically find that election results vary in line with conventional economic indicators, at both national and regional levels. This 6 study, on the other hand, demonstrates that trends in voting patterns at a regional level in the Czech Republic emerged during the first post-communist election, when standard economic cues, such as the unemployment and inflation rates and GDP growth were limited, or were not highly informative with respect to future economic conditions, as the economic reform process had not yet begun. An examination of the 1990 election reveals substantial regional variation in support for pro-reform and leftwing parties, while the unemployment rate was very low across all regions and only varied between 0.09% and 1.91% at the time of the election. The failure of such contemporary economic variables to explain regional voting patterns in the first election suggests that other factors determined these initial voting patterns. This paper proposes that this unobservable phenomenon was the region's inheritance from the communist period, embodied in the endowments of physical and human capital present in the region, its trade orientation 5 and its sectoral employment distribution.
Furthermore, despite the limited regional variation in regards unemployment and wage rates during the early 1990's, regions throughout the Czech Republic greatly differed in regards their initial endowments. This study demonstrates that these endowments subsequently influenced expectations about the outcomes of the reform process, regional election results and economic developments during the transition period.
It should be noted that the majority of post-communist economic voting studies do not analyse the founding election in the post-communist state, as it is argued that this election is a referendum on communism, and hence economic voting models should not apply. This paper demonstrates that while contemporary regional economic conditions, which were an outcome of the reform process, influenced voting 7 decisions in later elections (see Fidrmuc, 2000a , 2000b and Tucker, 2001 , these voting patterns were largely pre-determined in 1990.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes Czech voting patterns and highlight trends in the data across regions and time. Section 3 introduces the data and methodology employed in the analysis. Section 4 presents the results of the two-part empirical analysis. Sub-section 4.1 presents the estimates of three models of five Czech elections from 1990-2002, and sub-section 4.2 investigates the prospectiveness of the 1990 election. Finally, section 5 discusses the overall findings of the study.
Voting Patterns in the Czech Republic
The Czech Republic is the only East European country to experience continuous democracy during the inter-war period. Czechoslovakia's had four free elections during the First Republic (1920, 1925, 1929 and 1935) and a semi-free election in 1946. Since 1990, the Czech Republic has held five parliamentary elections to the Chamber of Deputies (lower house). While the first three elections (1990, 1992 and 1996) resulted in the re-election of the pro-reform right-wing government, the 1998 and 2002 election saw the centre-left Social-Democrats form a minority government.
The main obstacle to overcome when analysing post-communist elections is the high degree of fragmentation across the political parties over time. To overcome this fragmentation inherent to the Czech political system, parties in this analysis are divided into four main categories -Pro-Reform, Centre-Left, Communist and Others. Table 1 displays the list of individual parties that constitute each group for each election year. The categorisation has been based on the perceived political orientation of the parties before the elections, rather than the actual policies pursued by the parties 8 ex-post. Mateju and Rehakova (1996) find that the positions of Czech parties remained relatively stable throughout the post-communist period, and that it was the voters, not the political parties, that moved within the left-right spectrum. Fidrmuc (2000a Fidrmuc ( , 2000b and Tucker (2001) , it serves as an intermediary between the macro and micro approaches to economic voting. Using regional data assumes voting behaviour is determined by economic conditions in the voters' immediate surroundings, which have a more direct and tangible effect on the voters' preferences than the national economic environment. Therefore, one may expect that regional level data will reveal relationships that do not emerge from national data. For example, while there was a general pro-market euphoria at a national level in the early transition period, and hence high support for pro-reform parties, an analysis of electoral data reveals that this euphoria was not universally shared, such that individual regions displayed considerable heterogeneity in their electoral preferences.
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The dependent variable is the proportion of votes, V ij , that each party category j receives from voters in region i. Therefore, the data display two specific properties that need to be taken into account in the analysis 11 : the individual observations lie between 0 and 1, and the proportion of votes received by all parties sum to one. The majority of voting studies to date have been estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) . 12 Yet, as argued by Jackson (2001) and Tomz, Tucker and Wittenberg (2002) , OLS is inappropriate for analyses of elections in multiparty systems, as it does not satisfy either of the above mentioned restrictions. In particular, OLS can result in predicted vote shares that are negative or exceed 1 (that is, 100%).
All regressions in this analysis are estimated using the Seemingly Unrelated
Regression (SUR) model that takes account of the adding-up constraint characteristic of election data. SUR is a special case of generalized least squares, which estimates a set of equations with cross-equation constraints imposed. Specifically, it allows for the possibility that the residuals are correlated across parties. Therefore, if one party has a large positive residual, the others will have small and some negative residuals for that observation. Estimating a set of seemingly unrelated regressions jointly as a system yields more efficient estimates than estimating them separately, especially as the correlation among the errors rises and the correlation among the independent variables falls (Greene, 2000) . SUR is also particularly efficient when the independent variables differ from one equation to the next. Overall SUR is more appropriate and no less efficient or convenient than estimating individual OLS equations for each party (Tomz et al., 2002) . In order to test for the appropriateness of the SUR, the Breusch-Pagan test is performed for each model.
Two sets of explanatory variables are employed. 14 In addition, a dummy variable is included to control for Moravian regions, which typically support the Moravian parties 15 , especially in the earlier elections. Table 3 presents an overview of the explanatory variables used in the analysis.
These regional indicators highlight the uneven distribution of the costs and benefits of the transition process. The economic indicators, particularly the unemployment rate, prove the most volatile. Several studies (Fidrmuc, 2000a; Bell, 1997; Pacek, 1994) have cited that increased unemployment has been the most severe outcome of the transition process, rising from an average of 0.71% in 1990 to 9.94% in 2002. As the unemployment rate is one of the primary determinants of voting behaviour, especially in post-communist countries, this analysis focuses on the impact of regional unemployment on election results.
Second, in order to test the hypothesis that expectations of future regional economic conditions influence voting behaviour, and that electoral decisions during the initial stages of the transition process were prospectively orientated, a measure capturing the regions' economic predictions is utilised. This measure is taken from the Economic Expectation and Attitudes (EEA) survey dataset. The EEA surveys were carried out in the Czech Republic between 1990 Republic between -1998 Responses to the following 14 question were aggregated to the regional level and the mean value calculated:
"Looking into the near future, are you afraid of economic development? Do you have a feeling of insecurity? Whereby answers are coded on the following four-point scale:
1="Definitely yes", 2="Rather yes", 3="Rather no", 4="Definitely no". This measure captures the extent to which a region believes it will be a "winner" or "loser" in the Table 4 presents the correlation of NAED90 and objective unemployment rates over time. There is a negative and significant relationship between prospective expectations and future economic outcomes with the correlation becoming stronger over time. This suggests that regions which were not afraid of economic development in 1990
subsequently had lower unemployment in the future, suggesting that voters' expectations about future economic conditions proved correct.
Results
There are two stages to the empirical analysis. Section 4.1 estimates three models for each of the five elections, in order to examine the evolution of Czech voting patterns and to test the classic retrospective hypothesis against models of prospective voting. Section 4.2 then focuses on the first election in the post-communist period in order to test whether voting behaviour was an outcome of prospective thinking.
Models of Czech Voting Behaviour
Tables 5 
Model 1: The Classic Retrospective Approach
The retrospective model would predict that support for incumbent parties is negatively related to the unemployment rate in the period prior to the election as they are punished for not improving economic conditions during their time in office.
Conversely, support for opposition parties is positively related to the unemployment rate. Therefore if this model holds the Pro-Reform parties should be punished for large increases in unemployment between the 1992, 1996 and 1998 elections while they were in power, and the Centre-Left parties should be punished for high unemployment in the 2002 election after winning the 1998 election.
Model 1 in Tables 5-9 and 1998 elections (see Tables 7 and 8) , as the change in regional unemployment has no impact on support for any of the parties grouping. Given the large increases in unemployment throughout this period, the retrospective hypothesis would predict that voters would punish the incumbents and reward the opposition parties, however the Czech elections of 1996 and 1998 disputes this hypothesis.
Interestingly, unemployment change does have an impact in the 2002 election (Table 9) (2000) who also find that the responsibility hypothesis does not hold in transition economies.
Models 2 and 3: Initial Expectations and Voting Patterns
Model 2 in Tables 5-9 replaces the change in regional unemployment with the "Not Afraid of Economic Development 1990" variable (NAED90 henceforth), which captures the regions' initial predictions about the future. Model 3 then includes both the unemployment measure and the NAED90 measure in order to test which variable has the greater impact on vote choice (see Table 4 for the correlation of these two measures over time). Table 5 shows that, unlike the unemployment indicator, the NAED90 measure has a significant impact on all three party groups in the 1990 election. Regions that are not afraid of economic development in the future show greater support for Pro-Reform parties, than for the Communists or Others. This effect is replicated in model 3, suggesting that predictions about the future had a greater effect on vote choice in the 1990 election than contemporary economic indicators.
This provides evidence that voting behaviour in the first free election in the postcommunist period was prospectively orientated, whereby regions, taking their initial endowments into consideration, formed judgements about how they would fare in the new economic system. Regions that feared economic development in the future voted for either Communist or Other parties, in the hope of either delaying or halting economic reforms, while regions that were optimistic about the future, supported ProReform parties in order to accelerate the reform process.
A similar pattern emerged in the 1992 election (Table 6) , whereby NAED90 has a positive and significant effect on the Pro-Reform parties and a negative effect on the Communist and Other parties. Model 3 which includes both the percentage change in unemployment between 1990-1992 and the NAED90 measure, shows that predictions about future economic outcomes has a stronger impact on vote choice than the unemployment measure. The 1996 election (Table 7) deviates from this pattern slightly, in that the NAED90 measure has no statistical effect on support for the Centre-Left, Communist or Other groups, and only has a positive and weakly significant (10%) effect on support for the Pro-Reform parties. However, model 3
shows that the subjective NAED90 measure does impact vote choice unlike the objective unemployment measure. Model 2 of the 1998 election (Table 8) shows that these initial economic forecasts (NAED90) again impact on the 1998 vote choicesregions with optimistic expectations display greater support for Pro-Reform parties than the Centre-Left, Communist or Other parties. Model 3 shows that the change in regional unemployment between 1996 and 1998 has no influence voting decisions in the 1998 election while NAED90 has a strong impact on electoral outcomes, again suggesting that economic forecasts made in 1990 have a greater impact on election outcomes than contemporary economic indicators. Finally, both models 2 and 3 in Table 9 show that a region's predictions of the future in 1990 continue to influence voting decisions in the 2002 election, i.e., twelve years after the initial forecasts were made.
Overall, these results indicate that economic conditions influence electoral outcomes in the later elections, however they also show that expectations of these economic conditions formed in 1990 are often a better determinant of vote choice than election year economic indicators. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that given future economic conditions were anticipated in 1990, when the economic outcomes were actually realised, contemporary economic conditions had little impact on the election outcomes as they were already incorporated into the voter's decision set.
18 It should also be noted that models including the NAED measure for 1992, 1996
and 1998 19 were also estimated. Interestingly, these models show that 1990
expectations are better determinants of vote choice than election year predictions.
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The impact of the socio-economic and demographic variables on vote choice is discussed below.
Socio-Economic and Demographic Factors
While the primary motivation of this analysis is to examine how unemployment, the most salient outcome of the transition process, influences voting behaviour, additional factors that capture the regions' initial endowments are also included. Tables 5-9 show that % entrepreneurship, % Roman Catholic, % university As the transition process often has adverse effects on the elderly, a variable capturing the proportion of retirees in each region is included. Tables 5-9 show that this hypothesis is refuted, as retirees show greater support for Pro-Reform parties, and are less likely to support Centre-Left parties, while having no effect on support for the Communist party. However these effects are weak and inconsistent across elections.
Next, in order to capture difference in voting behaviour between urban and rural areas, a measure of population density is included as a proxy for this in all models. As it does not have an impact on vote choice, such an urban-rural distinction is not found.
The evolution of the service sector, and the subsequent downsizing of industrial and agricultural sectors is another major outcome of the transition process.
One would expect regions with a high dependency on industrial and agricultural 
The 1990 Election: The Case of Prospective Thinking?
This section examines whether prospective judgements formed in 1990 were informative with respect to the subsequent outcome of the economic reforms. Table   10 These results are reported in Table 11 . Each of the four models show that the unemployment rates in all four years exerts the same influence on 1990 election results, i.e., they have a negative and significant impact on support for the Pro-Reform parties and a positive and significant effect on support for the Communists and Other 24 parties. Therefore, the relationship between 1990 voting patterns and the 2002 unemployment rate is just as strong as its relationship with the 1992, 1996 and 1998 unemployment rates, even though a right-wing Pro-Reform government was in power at the start of the 1990's and a left-wing government was in power in the later stages of the transition process. This suggests electoral engineering was not employed during the transition process and that voting behaviour during the earlier election did not create unemployment in the later stages. The causality runs in the opposite direction, as expected. Overall, these results provide evidence that regions were prospectively orientated in 1990 and that these predictions turned out to be accurate.
One could question why voters continued to participate in elections at all,
given that the regional problems were structural, and as such, future economic outcomes could be predicted in 1990. However, Downs (1957) , Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and Orviska et al. (2001) argue that individuals gain utility from voting and that they vote in order to fulfil a civic duty, partly out of fear that democracy will collapse without such participation. This concern is even more relevant in young democratising countries, such as the Czech Republic. Therefore, while the outcomes of the transition process were, to an extent, anticipated, the newly endowed privilege of voting in elections and the desire to maintain and support the new democracy, encouraged voters to participate in the post-communist elections. In addition, voters in regions with bad initial conditions in 1990 could foresee that the economic reform program would have a detrimental effect on their regions development. Indeed, these expectations turned out to be accurate, however, they continued to participate in elections and vote for more left-wing parties in the hope of softening the burden of these unfavourable economic conditions by voting for parties favouring more expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. So while these regions subsequently had higher unemployment than regions which with good economic conditions in 1990, they continued to vote for such parties in order to offset their economic misfortune through social safety nets, such as increased unemployment benefits.
Discussion
Despite the initial euphoria following the Velvet Revolution, the Czech Republic's first free election in forty-four years yielded varying levels of regional support for the new-regime parties, hence contesting the conventionally held belief that support for the new economic and political system was homogenous. Such regional variation in voting patterns was not matched with analogous patterns in regional economic conditions, as implied by the classic retrospective economic voting hypothesis. Czech regions at the start of the transition period were characterised by relatively low and uniform unemployment rates. Therefore, initial trends in voting patterns were consolidated at a time when contemporary economic cues did not exist.
Voters could not base their political judgements on economic developments of the past, but rather were forced to look to the future in order to predict their standing in the new market economy, and vote accordingly in an attempt to optimise this position.
This paper proposes that voting in transition economies was prospective, such that voters could accurately predict the effects of the economic reform program, and internalising these predictions, formed vote choices that would persist throughout the transition period.
Regions that initially voted for right-wing Pro-Reform parties in the 1990
election did so with a belief that economic development was a good thing and that they would survive and thrive in an open market economy. Voting for such parties would ensure fast-speed reforms and rapid access to the opportunities presented by the 26 new market economy. As such, these regions foresaw they would become the "winners" of the transition process. "Winner" regions were typically endowed with good initial conditions, such as greater pre-transition trade to thriving market economies, good infrastructure, and a well-educated labour force. These regions, which continued to support Pro-Reform parties, subsequently had lower unemployment rates, therefore signifying that their initial predictions, which were formed by taking account of these initial endowments rather than contemporary economic conditions, proved correct, even twelve years after the first election.
Conversely, regions that supported left-wing parties in the first election, believed economic reforms would have an adverse effect on their regional development, albeit relative to the "winner" regions. These "loser" regions were characterised by poor initial conditions, such as a reliance on CMEA orientated trade, over-industrialisation and a high dependence on a single industry, e.g., coal mining.
The optimal strategy for these regions was to support left-wing parties, which advocated high social welfare spending and a strong state, in the hope of either maintaining the status quo or help in alleviating the outcomes induced by harsh reforms. The "loser" regions subsequently had higher unemployment in the later stages of transition, again suggesting that initial predictions of future outcomes proved accurate.
Political constraints are central to the theoretical literature on the economics of transition. These constraints assume that voters, with rational expectations, taking stock of endowments from the planning era, can predict, under some uncertainty, whether they would become "winners" or "losers" of reform. Stokes (1996) and Weyland (1998) , who examine Peruvian and Venezuelan voters respectively, both find that despite painful economic reforms, voters tend to be prospectively orientated and are willing to accept short-term economic pains.
Similarly, Gelineau (2001) finds that Argentinean voters in times of economic upheaval and reforms tend to contradict the classic economic voting view such that they are prospectively orientated.
5 Industrial organization theory has identified two types of export industries in transition economies.
First, industries that exported to the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) market under communism have lower probability of surviving the transition process as their goods are generally of a lower quality and become obsolete. Second, firms that exported to the West under communism have a higher probability of surviving and prospering in transition (see Repkine and Walsh, 1999 12 Tomz et al. (2002) report that out of nineteen articles analysing multiparty election data published in leading political science journals between 1996-2000, eighteen use OLS.
13 Regional economic and demographic variables were all obtained from Czech Statistical Yearbooks 1990-2002. 14 Note that while the economic indicators correspond to the election year values, such yearly indicators were not available for the demographic variables, therefore, the nearest year available was used. As demographic indicators are generally stable overtime this should not be problematic.
15 Such as the Movement for Self-Governing Democracy -Association for Moravia and Silesia (HSD-SMS), later HSDMS (Movement for Self-Governing Democracy of Moravia and Silesia).
16 11 EEA surveys were conducted semi-annually (1990) (1991) (1992) and annually (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) 
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17 Note that when modelling the 1990 election the unemployment rate is used rather than the percentage change in unemployment between the election periods, as 1990 was the first free election in the postcommunist period.
18 Similarly, Palmer and Whitten (1999) posit that voters are primarily concerned with the unexpected, rather than the expected, components of inflation and growth, as the unexpected components have real income effects and are a better indicator of government competence. Using data from 19 industrialized economies between 1970-94, they find stronger electoral effects for the unexpected components of inflation and growth, than their overall levels.
19 As the last EEA survey was conducted in 1998, there is no such measure for 2002 model. 20 These results are available upon request.
21 Unfortunately, the entrepreneurship and sectoral variables are not available for the 1990 period and hence are excluded from the 1990 models. Tables   Table 1 Political Spectrum of 3.222 (7.101) 50.029*** (13.990) 27.212 (16.892) 8.989 (7.325) 62.271*** (13.681) 25.157 (17.270) 6.804 (7.414) 66.704*** Notes: Number of observations is 76. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimated using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model. Average wage, population density, retired, university education, Roman Catholic and Moravian dummy variables are also included but not reported. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
